

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

7 March 1944

Dr. William Langer, Chief
Research and Analysis Branch
Office of Strategic Services

Dear Bill:

Here are copies of two papers I obtained
from Colonel Adams of the Engineer Corps who was
in command in Naples. I thought you might be
interested in getting his views.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachments

7 March 1944

Colonel Donald B. Adams
391 Beach Mount Drive
New Rochelle, New York

My dear Colonel:

Here are the pipes you were good
enough to loan me. They were of great
I appreciate having them.

I hope you are having a good leave
and look forward to seeing you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachments

COPY

26

HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 837
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER

2 February 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Brigadier General C.R. Moore,
Chief Engineer, ETOUSA

1. Following your verbal instructions I submit herewith three (3) papers covering the following subjects:

- a. Real Estate.
- b. Relations of the Civil Affairs Organization to the Engineers.
- c. Civilian Labor.

2. These papers contain a resume of points considered important on going into a "new" country as a result of my experience as Engineer, E.B.S. in Algeria and Tunisia, and as Commanding Officer, Metropolitan Area of Naples.

DONALD D. ADAMS,
Colonel, C.E.

cc. Engr File
Col. Adams.

COPY

(COPY)

RELATION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION TO CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. These notes are based on experience with Civil Affairs, i.e. A.M.G. and A.C.C., during the first three months and a half of the occupation of the Metropolitan Area of Naples.

2. The A.M.G. is divided into the following:

a. The District organization, which more or less conforms to the "International Line" between the U.S. forces and the British forces.

b. The Provincial organization, which roughly conforms to the respective Italian provinces.

c. The City of Naples' organization.

3. The A.C.C. watches over and controls to an extent concerning which the writer is unfamiliar, the "King's Italy". This is roughly the area lying to the south-east of the zones of the armies.

4. On entering the area, the basic principle was established that the A.M.G. had a primary interest in administrative and economic affairs except where or when such affairs directly affected Army personnel and military operations. In the latter cases, when, as and if "urgent military necessity" dictated such action, on request of the Base Section Commander or his representative, the A.M.G. would step aside. The A.M.G. however, always offered their co-operation until such time as the military situation was met and satisfied. These arrangements were accomplished with minimum friction.

5. The A.M.G. concerns itself, among other things, with the following:

- a. City Utilities. (gas, water, electricity.)
- b. Streets, roads, and bridges.
- c. Sewers, garbage removal and sanitation in general.

2. Civilian police.
3. Civilian prisoners.
4. Preservation of National Monument.
5. Black market activities.
6. Food, transportation and supplies for civilian activities.
7. Schools.
8. Evacuation.

6. In many of its activities, because the A.M.G. was severely restricted as to its means and because many of its actions had a direct bearing on the tactical troops, the Base Section Commander or his representative, was obliged to take over in whole and in part.

7. City Utilities:

a. Initially, an adequate supply of water for the City of Naples was restored soon after the occupation of the city by the Army Engineers. Service was maintained by Base Section Water Supply units, by Engineer Utility units, and by personnel of the local Water Company.

b. Gas service was in part, initially turned on by orders of A.M.G. Because of lack of proper warning, some asphyxiations of military personnel occurred, and because of lack of proper testing of the system there were some minor explosions. This caused the rehabilitation of the gas system to be taken over by the Base Section Commander. By his orders, gas was later turned on in certain parts of the City, after proper steps had been taken to warn civilian as well as military personnel, and proper engineering tests had been made to prevent the accumulation of gas pockets. The assistance of Base Section technical troops, namely a Pipe Line unit, was supplied to help put part of the gas plant in better producing condition.

c. The initial supply of electric power was brought into the city through the efforts of Army Engineers, supplemented by Base Section engineers. These troops repaired transmission

lines, and finally put into operation one of the local diesel generating plants. Overall planning by representatives of A.I.G., A.M.S., A.S.C. and A.F.H.Q. had been in process for sometime but the actual putting of the juice over the lines was due to the work of the army and Base Section engineer troops. The overall co-ordination by the higher echelons above referred to will undoubtedly be of advantage later on when it is made effective. Provision, as now contemplated for large generating units, mounted on ships and on railway cars, will most assuredly be a major advantage.

d. City streets were in bad condition owing to continued lack of up-keep. The Base Section Engineers took over part of the job of clearing debris and repairing the arterial streets, utilizing to the maximum all of the city's facilities. This required a considerable number of U. S. Engineer troops, army transportation, and engineer equipment. Close supervision and a firm policy was necessary to persuade the city authorities to put a sufficient number of workers on the streets to do the many small jobs where no question of transportation or material presented itself.

Roads outside the city were repaired and maintained first by the Army Engineers and later on to the rear of the Army area by the Base Section Engineers. Temporary bridges were built according to the same plan. Enough bridges were built to permit an ample flow of essential traffic. Permanent repairs to roads and bridges are left for the City and Province to accomplish later on.

The Base Section Commander was obliged to impose restrictions on animal-drawn and human-drawn civilian vehicles. A plan was put into effect which only allowed such vehicles to cross the main arteries at certain points and not to proceed on those main arteries other than for the shortest possible distance. This accelerated the flow of military traffic. A similar scheme will probably be necessary in any occupied Latin country.

A policy was insisted upon of forcing local city

agencies to pile their spoil from street repairs on the sidewalks and not in the streets. The tendency was to block the traffic in the streets, possibly so that the pedestrian could pass with comfort. This created an impossible situation in an area closely supporting tactical troops and had to be corrected.

e. Sewers did not suffer too great an amount of damage because of the character of their construction. The large stone viaducts which had been smashed in were closed and put into operation by the combined efforts of U. S. military troops and civilians working under the instructions of the

f. Garbage removal was a serious situation and was to become more serious with the advent of the fly-over season. This was finally taken over by the Base Section which was making no headway. The Base Section Commander decided that all possible city facilities, which included about fifty horse-drawn vehicles, and about one hundred carts, be utilized. To achieve this, close supervision was necessary as the city officials seem to be little else. The City authorities requested by additional army transportation, the working of the with the disposal of the many piles of green garbage scattered throughout the city.

g. The police of Naples consists of civil police who are quite ineffective, and the Carabinieri who are organized like American State police. The Carabinieri of Italy are organized and occupy approximately the same status as the Gendarmerie of France. The A.M.G. took over the supervision of the civil police. The Carabinieri were divided between the Base and the Commanding Officer of the Metropolitan Area. The Carabinieri in the Metropolitan Area work in co-operation with the British Military police and were, when so used, very effective. Alone they have little value. Occupying troops pay no attention to them, on the contrary U. S. troops, particularly tactical troops, held up the Carabinieri, even taking their weapons as souvenirs, and often preventing the Carabinieri from picking up civilian prisoners.

n. The A.M.G. took over part of the transportation of food and civilian supplies. However, having considerable difficulty in so doing they were forced to appeal to the Base Section Commander for help more and more frequently. It is apparently only a matter of time when the Base Section Commander will be charged, not only with the unloading, as he now is, of all civilian supplies, but with the storage and distribution of these supplies.

1. The evacuation of civilians from requisitioned quarters and the care of the many evacuees who are continually being pushed out between the lines by the retreating German troops have both been partially handled by A.M.G. In each case, however, a considerable amount of Army help has been necessary. It is to be noted that as the Germans are forced back they have a habit of assembling all the civilians in the area about to be evacuated by them, leaving the civilians between the lines where they must be cared for and picked up by the advancing allied troops. This of course creates German roads from congestion and creates a further strain on the allied system of supply.

8. From observation it is difficult to understand the A.M.G. in the area from the front line to the rear of the Base Section is of important assistance to the military effort. With a large staff, they of course are more constantly in touch with the civilian authorities than the Army or Base Section Commander can find time to be. However it would seem that if staff assistance was given to the Army Commander and to the Base Section Commander, the situation from the rear boundary of the Base Section forward could be worked out in a more orderly fashion than under the present set-up.

DONALD B. ADAMS,
Colonel, C.E.

(COPY)

CIVILIAN LABOR

1. These notes are based on experience with civilian labor of our "Allies" in Algeria and Tunisia, and that of our "Co-belligerents" in Italy.

2. The overall labor pool of the Base Section in the localities above mentioned, is arranged or gathered together and allotted out to the using services by the Civil Affairs officer or the Base Purchasing officer, whichever is the title given. It is the responsibility of the head of this Section to see that all pool labor is hired at established and agreed upon prices. The "stealing" of employees from one service by another using service offering greater inducement, should not be allowed. It is generally found necessary to use food to augment cash payments, but any system of paying partially with food must be standardized by all using services and all hiring agencies. The determination and co-ordination of a standard labor scale should be pre-determined and agreed to by all interested parties before it is put into effect, not afterwards.

3. The total number of civilian laborers employed normally runs into several thousands. These civilian workers are service troops, leaving troops available for such jobs as cannot be done by civilians. The assistance of the local authorities is always solicited and utilized to the utmost to obtain sufficient labor. In case of any question, the full co-operation of whatever remnants of the civil authorities still exist, must be firmly insisted upon.

4. All normal functions of the city or town government should be promptly re-constituted and again put in operation. It must be appreciated, however, that these agencies have long since lost most of their organization, most of their will to work has disappeared, and they will have practically nothing to work with.

5. To the Engineers, it is of the utmost importance in France or its possessions, to assist in re-constituting and supporting the Travail Public. Relations with the local heads

of this nation wide organization will pay big dividends in getting back in use equipment which has been hidden out, in available resources, and in general technical information. Help given to the Travaux Public in the form of equipment and transportation will be necessary and of the greatest advantage.

6. Arab labor was found to be poor. The workman was physically weak, unaccustomed to work continuously or hard, would not work in bad weather, and was accustomed to primitive methods. It was only the exceptional American supervisor who could get satisfactory results out of the Arabs.

Italian labor (south of Italy) has much the same tropical characteristics as the Arab. He is perhaps a little smarter, which makes him less dependable as his smartness finds an outlet mostly in devising schemes to steal and loaf.

French labor should be better, particularly as regards honesty. However it must be remembered that food will undoubtedly be the most important item, and cash payments of little importance. This will certainly be true while there is practically nothing that can be purchased.

7. The hiring systems used in Algeria, Tunisia and Italy have all been along the same lines as follows:

a. The using service makes its request for the next day's labor as early as possible, always before some dead-line on the day before.

b. The Section in charge of the gathering together of the labor pool through its civilian contacts, generally accomplishes by 0700 hours the gathering together of the necessary number of employees at one or more centrally located assembly pools.

c. The using section sends to the pool(s) one or more officers with necessary transportation and transports his employees from the pool to the work point.

d. At the end of the work period the employees are transported back to the pool in the same fashion.

8. For a twenty-four hour tour this program is repeated twice more.

9. For certain skilled help it has generally been necessary for a using service to set-up its own bus line to collect and deliver constantly employed individuals.

10. The use of the civilian contractor both direct and through agencies like the Travaux Public has shown fair results. These contractors must be continually and carefully watched in order to maintain adequate production. The Engineer must be prepared to furnish supplementary equipment including transportation, and to provide many supplies. Contractors in Axis occupied territory have become accustomed to being held up by difficulties in transportation, equipment and supplies. They then stop and wait for someone else to do something to remedy the situation.

11. In Tunisia the Engineer, on entering the territory, gathered into his equipment pool all equipment, road, concrete, and so forth, giving temporary receipts where it was possible, for such equipment as was taken. This equipment was in most cases broken down and not usable in the state in which it was found. The E.B.S. Engineer had the equipment repaired by the Maintenance and Shop Companies as promptly as possible. It was then used by U.S. engineer troops or often loaned back to local contractors, sometimes its own owner, under specific conditions for its use. As the motive power, fuel etc., comes from the occupying forces, this proved to be a satisfactory method of assuring that the equipment was put to its full use. Moreover, this method which might possibly be termed "high-handed" set up no resentment whatsoever. On the contrary it seemed to meet with the full satisfaction of our allies who possess, and probably will for some time in the future, possess so few means of helping themselves.

DONALD B. ADAMS,
Colonel, C.E.

(COPY)

CIVILIAN LABOR

1. These notes are based on experience with civilian labor from "Allies" in Algeria and Tunisia, and that of our "Co-belligerents" in Italy.

2. The overall labor pool of the Base Section in the localities above mentioned, is arranged or gathered together and directed out to the using services by the Civil Affairs officer or the Base Purchasing officer, whichever is the title given. It is the responsibility of the head of this Section to see that all pool labor is hired at established and agreed upon prices. The "stealing" of employees from one service by another using service offering greater inducement, should not be allowed. It is generally found necessary to use food to augment cash payments, but any system of paying partially with food must be standardized by all using services and all hiring agencies. The determination and co-ordination of a standard labor unit should be pre-determined and agreed to by all interested parties before it is put into effect, not afterwards.

3. The total number of civilian labourers employed normally runs into several thousands. These civilian workers free service troops, leaving troops available for such jobs as cannot be done by civilians. The assistance of the local authorities is always solicited and utilized to the utmost to obtain efficient labor. In case of any question, the full co-operation of whatever remnants of the civil authorities still exist, must be firmly insisted upon.

4. All normal functions of the city or town government should be promptly re-constituted and again put in operation. It must be appreciated, however, that these agencies have nearly since lost most of their organization, most of their will to work has disappeared, and they will have practically nothing to work with.

5. To the engineers, it is of the utmost importance in France or its possessions, to assist in re-constituting and supporting the Travaux Publics. Relations with the local head

of this nation wide organization will pay big dividends in getting back in use equipment which has been hidden out, in available resources, and in general technical information. Help given to the Travaux Public in the form of equipment and transportation will be necessary and of the greatest advantage.

6. Arab labor was found to be poor. The workman was physically weak, unaccustomed to work continuously or hard, would not work in bad weather, and was accustomed to primitive methods. It was only the exceptional American supervisor who could get satisfactory results out of the Arabs.

Italian labor (south of Italy) has much the same tropical characteristics as the Arab. He is perhaps a little smarter, which makes him less dependable as his counterpart. His outlet mostly in devising schemes to steal and loaf.

French labor should be better, particularly as regards honesty. However it must be remembered that food will undoubtedly be the most important item, and cash payments of great importance. This will certainly be true while there is practically nothing that can be purchased.

7. The hiring systems used in Algeria, Tunisia and Italy have all been along the same lines as follows:

a. The using service makes its request for the next day's labor as early as possible, always before noon preceding on the day before.

b. The Section in charge of the gathering together of the labor pool through its civilian contacts, generally accomplishes by 0700 hours the gathering together of the necessary number of employees at one or more centrally located assembly pools.

c. Each using section sends to the pool(s) one or more officers with necessary transportation and transports his employees from the pool to the work point.

d. At the end of the work period the employees are transported back to the pool in the same fashion.

8. For a twenty-four hour tour this program is repeated twice more.

9. For certain skilled help it has generally been necessary for a using service to set-up its own bus line to collect and deliver constantly employed individuals.

10. The use of the civilian contractor both direct and through agencies like the Travaux Public has shown fair results. These contractors must be continually and carefully watched in order to maintain adequate production. The Engineer must be prepared to furnish supplementary equipment including transportation, and to provide many supplies. Contractors in Axis occupied territory have become accustomed to being held up by difficulties in transportation, equipment and supplies. They then stop and wait for someone else to do something to remedy the situation.

11. In Tunisia the Engineer, on entering the territory, gathered into his equipment pool all equipment, tools, concrete, and so forth, giving temporary receipts where it was possible, for such equipment as was taken. This equipment was in most cases broken down and not usable in the state in which it was found. The E.B.S. Engineer had the equipment repaired by the Maintenance and Shop Companies as promptly as possible. It was then used by U.S. engineer troops or often loaned back to the contractors, sometimes its own owner, under specific conditions for its use. As the motive power, fuel etc., comes from the occupying forces, this proved to be a satisfactory method, assuming that the equipment was put to its full use. Moreover, this method which might possibly be termed "high-handed" set up no resentment whatsoever. On the contrary it seemed to meet with the full satisfaction of our allies who presently, and for some time in the future, possess no few means of arming themselves.

DONALD B. ALLAN,
Colonel, U.S.A.

(COPY)

RELATION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION TO CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. These notes are based on experience with Civil Affairs, i.e., A.M.G. and A.C.C., during the first three months and a half of the occupation of the Metropolitan Area of Naples.

2. The A.M.G. is divided into the following:

a. The District organization, which more or less conforms to the "International Line" between the U.S. forces and the British forces.

b. The Provincial organization, which roughly conforms to the respective Italian provinces.

c. The City of Naples' organization.

3. The A.C.C. watches over and controls to an extent concerning which the writer is unfamiliar, the "King's Italy". This is roughly the area lying to the south-east of the zones of the armies.

4. On entering the area, the basic principle was established that the A.M.G. had a primary interest in all governmental and economic affairs except where or when such affairs directly affected Army personnel and military operations. In the latter cases, when, as and if "urgent military necessity" dictated such action, on request of the Base Section Commander or his representative, the A.M.G. would step aside. The A.M.G. however, always offered their co-operation until such time as the military situation was met and satisfied. These arrangements were accomplished with minimum friction.

5. The A.M.G. concerns itself, among other things, with the following:

- a. City Utilities. (gas, water, electricity.)
- b. Streets, roads, and bridges.
- c. Sewers, garbage removal and sanitation in general.

- d. Civilian police.
- e. Civilian prisoners.
- f. Preservation of National Monuments.
- g. Blackmarket activities.
- h. Food, transportation and supplies for civilian activities.
- i. Schools.
- j. Evacuees.

6. In many of its activities, because the A.M.G. was severely restricted as to its means and because many of its missions had a direct bearing on the tactical troops, the Base Section Commander or his representative, was obliged to take over in whole and in part.

7. City Utilities.

a. Initially, an adequate supply of water for the City of Naples was restored soon after the occupation of the city by the Army Engineers. Service was maintained by Base Section Water Supply units, by Engineer Utility units, and by personnel of the local Water Company.

b. Gas service was in part, initially turned on by orders of A.M.G. Because of lack of proper earnings, some asphyxiations of military personnel occurred, and because of lack of proper testing of the system there were some minor explosions. This caused the rehabilitation of the gas system to be taken over by the Base Section Commander. By his orders, gas was later turned on in certain parts of the City, after proper steps had been taken to warn civilian as well as military personnel, and proper engineering tests had been made to prevent the accumulation of gas pockets. The assistance of Base Section technical troops, namely a Pipe Line unit, was supplied to help put part of the gas plant in better producing condition.

c. The initial supply of electric power was brought into the city through the efforts of Army Engineers, supplemented by Base Section engineers. These troops repaired transmission

lines and finally put into operation one of the local diesel generating plants. Overall planning by representatives of A.A.C., F.A.S.B., A.C.C. and A.F.H.C. had been in process for sometime but the actual putting of the juice over the lines was due to the work of the army and Base Section engineer troops. The overall co-ordination by the higher echelons above referred to will undoubtedly be of advantage later on when it is made effective. Provision, as now contemplated for large generating units, mounted on ships and on railway cars, will most assuredly be a major advantage.

d. City streets were in bad condition owing to continued lack of up-keep. The Base Section Engineers took over part of the job of clearing debris and repairing the arterial streets, utilizing to the maximum all of the city's facilities. This required a considerable number of U. S. Engineer troops, army transportation, and engineer equipment. Close supervision and a firm policy was necessary to persuade the city authorities to put a sufficient number of workers on the streets to do the many small jobs where no question of transportation or material presented itself.

Roads outside the city were repaired and maintained first by the Army Engineers and later on to the rear of the Army area by the Base Section Engineers. Temporary bridges were built according to the same plan. Enough bridges were built to permit an ample flow of essential traffic. Permanent repairs to roads and bridges are left for the City and Province to accomplish later on.

The Base Section Commander was obliged to impose restrictions on animal-drawn and human-drawn civilian vehicles. A plan was put into effect which only allowed such vehicles to cross the main arteries at certain points and not to proceed on these main arteries other than for the shortest possible distance. This accelerated the flow of military traffic. A similar scheme will probably be necessary in any occupied Latin country.

A policy was insisted upon of forcing local city

agencies to pile their spoil from street repairs on the sidewalks and not in the streets. The tendency was to block the traffic in the streets, possibly so that the pedestrians could pass with comfort. This created an impossible situation for the area closely supporting tactical troops and had to be cleared.

g. Sewers did not suffer too great an amount of damage because of the character of their construction. The stone viaducts which had been smashed in were cleaned out and put into operation by the combined efforts of U. S. Engineers, troops and civilians working under the instructions of U. S. Engineers.

i. Garbage removal was a serious situation from the start to become more serious with the advent of the big-brother situation. This was finally taken over by the Base Section Command which was making no headway. The Base Section Command decided that all possible city facilities, which included about fifty-horse-drawn vehicles, and about one hundred carts, be utilized. To achieve this, close cooperation was necessary as the city officials seem to be of the intention but very little else. The City Section, augmented by additional army transportation, was working with the disposal of the many piles of green garbage throughout the city.

g. The police of Naples consist of Carabinieri and American State police. The Carabinieri of Italy are organized and occupy approximately the same status as the Gendarmes of France. The A.M.G. took over the supervisory role of civil police. The Carabinieri were divided between the Base and the Commanding Officer of the Metropolitan Area. The Carabinieri in the Metropolitan Area work in co-operation with the American and British Military police and were, when so used, very effective. Alone they have little value. Occupying troops paid no attention to them, on the contrary U. S. troops, particularly tactical troops, held up the Carabinieri, even taking away their weapons as souvenirs, and often preventing the Carabinieri from picking up civilian prisoners.

h. The A.M.G. took over part of the transportation of food and civilian supplies. However, having considerable difficulty in so doing they were forced to appeal to the Base Section Commander for help more and more frequently. It is apparently only a matter of time when the Base Section Commander will be charged, not only with the unloading, assembling, of all civilian supplies, but with the storage and distribution of these supplies.

i. The evacuation of civilians from requisitioned quarters and the care of the many evacuees who are continually being pushed out between the lines by the retreating German troops have both been partially handled by A.M.G. In each case, however, a considerable amount of Army help has been necessary. It is to be noted that as the Germans are forced back they have a habit of assembling all the civilians in the area about to be evacuated by them, leaving the civilians between the lines where they must be cared for and picked up by the advancing allied troops. This of course increases German roads from congestion and creates a further strain on the allied system of supply.

8. From observation it is difficult to understand how the A.M.G. in the area from the front line to the rear of the Base Section is of important assistance to the military effort. With a large staff, they of course are more constantly in contact with the civilian authorities than the Army or Base Section Commander can find time to be. However it would seem that if staff assistance was given to the Army Commander and to the Base Section Commander, the situation from the rear boundary of the Base Section forward could be worked out in a more orderly fashion than under the present set-up.

DONALD B. ALMS,
Colonel, C.M.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
 GSS, SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2
 APO 464, U. S. ARMY

20 January 1944.

SUBJECT: Notes of Don McKay's Opinion on AMGOT.

TO : General Donovan.

1. Comments made by Don McKay and his group to your question "What's wrong with AMGOT" were:

a. Civil Affairs Branch was not equipped to handle the language, had inadequate Italian speaking personnel which made it necessary to have papers and documents translated into English. This limited the volume and extent of work handled.

b. Civil Affairs was held down (ie held back) in its work waiting for an Italian Government to jell.

c. Further hindrance to productive results is being caused by the merger with the Allied Control Commission.

d. Interference by Military Authorities prevented AMGOT getting off to a sound start with the population because civilian supplies were not allowed to come in early and in volume. (Should have landed about same time as first assault wave).

e. Malnutrition of population is a major problem to be handled. Here general group discussed:

- (1). Black Market.
- (2). Graft by local officials.
- (3). Inflation - hence civil servants forced to graft.
- (4). Nutrition difficulties and the Black Market could be dealt with by adequate distribution of food. Means suggested was for Army to control the distribution down to the individual Italian.

2. Further comments of McKay and his group were:

f. That Martial Law administered by the Army would have been better.

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Civil affairs had too many staff officers and too few lower-ranking working-level officers and men.

c. Problems facing AMGOT were rough, hard ones and thankless tasks were the lot of the staff.

d. That the Donovan idea was sound and workable, to recruit and train Italian units of ten men each, and using as the appeal and purpose for the organization the regeneration of the fighting spirit in the better Italians.

C. S. VANDERBLUE,
Colonel; SC.

Copy to
Mr. Lang
Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]

CONFIDENTIAL